Pdf Verify MCP
未认领MCP server for PDF authenticity verification — cryptographic digital signature verification, tamper detection, PAdES baseline level detection, and PDF/A / PDF/UA declaration identification.
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已认领和已认证的服务器每周接受一次静态扫描，显示代码能触及的范围（外部服务、环境变量、shell 命令、代理配置目录）以及带有已知公告的依赖。认领此列表即可获得。 安全概况的工作原理
7 个工具中显示 7 个
文档中列出的工具 (7)
内容来自项目文档。服务器握手不会验证每个工具的说明或行为。
detect_pades_level
PAdES baseline level (B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA) with content-validated LTV data
evaluate_policy
Deterministic 4-value trust verdict (trustanduse / usewithcaution / humanreviewrequired / reject) from a fixed rule table over the verification facts, with domain profiles (contract, financial, legal, medical, government). The judge is code; the narrative is the LLM
identify_conformance
Declared PDF/A / PDF/UA conformance from XMP metadata
validate_clauses
Constraints mapped from ISO 32000-1/-2 clauses — the specification body itself, which the PDF/A and PDF/UA profiles do not cover
validate_conformance
PDF/A (ISO 19005) and PDF/UA (ISO 14289) validation: veraPDF when installed, built-in rule subset otherwise
verify_integrity
Tamper detection: incremental updates, changes after signing, DocMDP certification violations assessed per P value (below), and an object-level diff of the revision chain (which objects each update added, rewrote or freed). Incremental updates are legal, so the diff says what to review — no verdict
verify_signatures
Cryptographic verification, trust chain evaluation against trust anchors, revocation checking (embedded OCSP/CRL or online), RFC 3161 timestamp verification